Chicago-Kent College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Sungjoon Cho

2016

Comparison Excluding Commitments:
Incommensurability, Adjudication, and the
Unnoticed Example of Trade Disputes
Sungjoon Cho, Chicago-Kent College of Law
Richard Warner, Chicago-Kent College of Law

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/sungjoon_cho/81/

COMPARISON EXCLUDING COMMITMENTS:
INCOMMENSURABILITY, ADJUDICATION, AND
THE UNNOTICED EXAMPLE OF TRADE DISPUTES
Sungjoon Cho* and Richard Warner**
Abstract
We claim that there are important cases of “incommensurability” in
public policymaking, in which all relevant reasons are not always
comparable on a common scale as better, worse, or equally good. Courts
often fail to confront this. We are by no means the first to contend that
incommensurability exists. Yet incommensurability’s proponents have
failed to sway the courts mainly because they overlook the fact that there
are two types of incommensurability.
The first (“incompleteness
incommensurability”) consists of the lack of any appropriate metric for
making the comparison. We argue that this type of incommensurability is
relatively unproblematic in that courts are well-positioned to construct such
a metric if necessary. In contrast, the second (“comparison-excluding
incommensurability”) consists of a commitment that blocks comparison on
a common scale, even if such a scale does exist. Incommensurability of this
sort has not been widely acknowledged and does raise deep problems for
judicial decision-making.
When facing comparison-excluding
incommensurability, the courts should not always disregard such
commitments, but should acknowledge them in case such commitments are
justified in a procedural manner. In this sense, comparison-exclusion
incommensurability plays a key constitutive role in the construction of both
individual identities and collective identities.
INTRODUCTION
One of the cardinal complexities of public policymaking is the need
to make a singular choice among plausible alternatives. It may seem
obvious that one should choose based on a comparison of all relevant
reasons.1 Many embrace this as an ideal however difficult it may be to
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Or one of the strongest, since two or more reasons of equal strength may each be
**

2

Cho and Warner

[3-Feb-16

realize in practice. We disagree. More precisely, we disagree with a claim
that is often asserted along with the ideal: namely, that all relevant reasons
are always comparable on a common scale as better, worse, or equally
good.2 We make three claims. First, there are important cases of
incommensurability, cases in which it is not possible to compare reasons.
Second, courts should recognize and respond appropriately to
incommensurability. Third, unfortunately, adjudicators all too often
overlook incommensurability by taking for granted that comparison is
possible. Trade disputes, both domestic and international, offer excellent—
and practically important—examples of all three claims. Such disputes
often involve clashes of cultural values that, properly understood, raise
incommensurability questions. The trade dispute literature notes this fact,3
but the philosophical and jurisprudential literature does not. One of our
goals is to close this gap.4
We are by no means the first to contend that when adjudicators
ignore incommensurability, they fail to confront considerations that should
play a key role in their decisions. Incommensurability’s advocates,
however, have failed to sway the courts, which for the most part continue to
assume commensurability.5 Those advocates overlook the fact that there are
stronger than the rest.
2
See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 61 (1987).
3
See, e.g., Piet Eeckhout, The Scales of Trade: Reflections on the Growth and
Functions of the WTO Adjudicative Branch, 13 J. INT. ECON. LAW 3 (2010); but see Joel
Trachtman, Trade and … Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT.
LAW 32, 20–25 (1998) (opposing the incommensurability thesis, in the form of an
economic (cost-benefit test); Patrick Capps, Incommensurability, Purposivity and
International Law, EUR. J. INT. LAW (2000), http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/11/3/547.pdf
(defending commensurability).
4
For discussions focused on domestic law, see Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Richard Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows
at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democracy, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2121 (1990); John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEVELAND ST. L.
REV. 1 (1990); Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking,
33 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 333, 341-42, 352-53 (1992) ; Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming
Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 562 (1992); Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 779 (1994); Richard Warner, Excluding Reasons: Impossible Comparisons and the
Law, 15 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 431 (1995) [hereinafter Warner, Excluding
Reasons]; Richard Warner, Impossible Comparisons and Rational Choice Theory, 68
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1705 (1995) [hereinafter Warner, Impossible
Comparisons]; Richard Warner, Does Incommensurability Matter?, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1287 (1998) [hereinafter Warner, Does Incommensurability Matter?]; Dennis Thompson,
Public Reason and Precluded Reasons, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2073 (2004).
5
See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management
Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007). In United Haulers, the Court explained their decision
to uphold the statute at hand: “After years of discovery, both the Magistrate Judge and the
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two types of incommensurability.6 The first – incompleteness
incommensurability – consists of the lack of an appropriate metric for
making the comparison. We argue that this type of incommensurability, as
challenging as it may be in practice, is consistent with any realistic
conception of adjudication. It is not uncommon for courts to be called on to
construct appropriate metrics when they are initially lacking. The second –
comparison-excluding incommensurability – consists of a commitment that
is inconsistent with comparison on a common scale, even when such a scale
exists. Comparison is not impossible tout court, but impossible consistently
with the commitment. Incommensurability of this sort has not been widely
acknowledged and does raise deep problems for judicial decision-making.7
Comparison-excluding incommensurability plays a key constitutive
role in the construction of both individual and collective identities. So,
when adjudicators ignore comparison-excluding incommensurability, they
run the risk of eliminating individuals and societies from the very process
that is supposed to adjudicate among their conflicting concerns.8 How then
District Court could not detect any disparate impact on out-of-state as opposed to in-state
businesses. The Second Circuit alluded to, but did not endorse, a “rather abstract harm”
that may exist because “the Counties' flow control ordinances have removed the waste
generated in Oneida and Herkimer Counties from the national marketplace for waste
processing services.” 438 F.3d, at 160. We find it unnecessary to decide whether the
ordinances impose any incidental burden on interstate commerce because any arguable
burden does not exceed the public benefits of the ordinances.” (emphasis added). For a
decision employing the commensurability thesis to the opposite effect, see Granholm v.
Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2004), in which the Court held that different licensing standards for
non-Michigan wines did not serve any greater public interest in health than an even-handed
licensing scheme. For more case law and courts adopting the commensurability thesis, see,
e.g., Sandlands C&D, LLC v. County of Horry, 737 F.3d 45 (4th Cir. 2013) (an ordinance
prohibiting the disposal of waste at any site other than a publicly-owned landfill does not
violate the dormant commerce clause); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d
1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (California Low Carbon Fuel Standard regulations do not violate the
dormant commerce clause); Grant’s Dairy v. Commissioner of Maine Dept. of Agriculture,
232 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000) (scheme imposing minimum prices on milk dealers does not
violate dormant commerce clause); Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Penn. Milk
Marketing Bd., 462 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2006) (minimum milk pricing standards do not
violate the dormant commerce clause); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320
F.3d 200 (2nd Cir. 2003) (law prohibiting sellers from shipping cigarettes directly to
consumers does not violate the dormant commerce clause).
6
See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779 (1994).
7
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 339 (1986) (distinguishing the two types
of incommensurability).
8
Daniel K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth and the International Economic Order, 26 HARV.
INT. LAW J. 533, 550 (1985) (defining the myth of “normalcy” as “conscious efforts to
resolve disagreements whether through legal principles or otherwise, resolve around efforts
to produce images of sameness where they do not already exist.”). Tarullo warned that such
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should judicial practice change? Fortunately, the emerging practice itself
already suggests an answer. An examination of international and domestic
trade cases shows that courts do, recently and increasingly, replace the
comparison of reasons on a common scale with a procedurally adequate
investigation of the relevant regulations.9 We suggest that this may be
viable approach to adjudicating comparison-excluding commitments.
This article unfolds in the following sequence. Part I rejects the
notion of a common scale as too vague for our purposes and introduces
what we call “value-probability reasoning” as the basis of an alternative
explanation of incommensurability. Part II characterizes incompleteness
and comparison-excluding incommensurability in terms of valueprobability reasoning. Part III then introduces trade disputes as examples of
comparison-excluding incommensurability. Part IV discusses how courts
should address comparison-excluding incommensurability. This article
concludes that comparison-exclusion is inextricably linked to individual and
social identities.
I. WHAT KIND OF COMPARISON?
We appealed to the concept of a “common scale” to characterize
both commensurability and the varieties of incommensurability. That appeal
is problematic. The concept is so vague that there is a plausible argument
that whenever a person decides between alternatives there is always some
relevant common scale on which the reasons for the alternatives may be
compared. If this were true, it would follow that neither type of
incommensurability existed. To illustrate the problem, we consider the sort
of example proponents of incommensurability typically offer as a clear case
of the lack of relevant commons scale. We then appeal to the problem to
motivate our examination of comparison-excluding incommensurability.
A. A Typical Example
Imagine you are trying to choose between two actions: attending law
school in order to become a lawyer, and retiring to the woods to attempt to
write your first novel.10 You have good reason to believe that it is equally
likely that you will succeed in each endeavor. You have values—the
“lawyer values”—that favor the lawyer life. You value stability in personal
and financial matters, the role lawyers play in the legal system, and various
other aspects of what you envision as your life as a lawyer. But you also
myth “countenances, even demands, the eradication of communities of difference”.
9
See infra Section IV for our discussion of what counts as an adequate explanation.
10
JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON: ON THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ACTION (2002).
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have values—the “novelist values”—that favor being a novelist. You value
creative expression in novels, an art for which you have a deep love,
freedom from the 9 to 5 world, and a variety of other aspects of the life you
envision as a novelist. From perspective of the lawyer values, being lawyer
is a better option than being a novelist, and vice versa from the perspective
of the novelist values. Your problem is that you lack any third perspective
from which to adjudicate between the competing evaluations. You lack a
perspective that provides a common scale on which to rank the competing
reasons as better, worse, or equally good. This is not to say it is impossible
to have such a perspective. Suppose you valued political power more highly
than artistic creation and believed that being a lawyer would serve you
better in achieving such power than being a novelist would. If you valued
political power highly enough, it could serve as a perspective from which to
adjudicate the lawyer values and novelist values conflict in favor of the
former. But it is also possible to lack a perspective that provides a common
scale on which to rank the options.11
Suppose that is the case. How do you decide what to do? You could
of course adopt an arbitrary decision procedure like flipping a coin, but you
do not want to decide the direction of your life that way. You want to
decide for reasons.12 And you can. Imagine that you think about what to do
The problem would be solved if “(a) human beings had some single, well-defined
goal or function (a 'dominant end'), or (b) the differing goals which men in fact pursue has
some common factor, such as 'satisfaction of desire.'” JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). But, as Finnis notes, “neither of these conditions obtains. Only
an inhumane fanatic thinks that man is made to flourish in only one way or for only one
purpose.” Id.
12
Deciding for reasons does not require a common scale on which to compare the
lawyer-value reasons and the novelist-value reasons. As Raz points out, “Rational action is
action for (what the agent takes to be) an undefeated reason. It is not necessarily action for
a reason which defeats all others." RAZ, supra note 7, at 339. Raz emphasizes that choices
in cases of incommensurability "may be based on a reason. Though the reason is
incommensurate with the reason for the alternative it shows the value of that option and
when that option is chosen it is chosen because of its value." Id. at 338. John Finnis makes
essentially the same argument against Luban. John Finnis, Concluding Reflections, 38
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 231, 236 (1990). Finnis argues that "[c]hoice between incommensurable
options is often rational in two ways: (a) inasmuch as it opts for the chosen option for the
reason which make that option rationally appealing (even though those grounds do not
make that option unqualifiedly more appealing than alternative options; and (b) inasmuch
as it conforms to all the requirements of practical reasonableness which we call moral, e.
g., fairness, consistency, exclusion of any choice to destroy, damage, or impede any basic
human good, etc. Both (a) and (b) provide rich grounds for rational criticism of choices."
Id. at 23738. Sunstein is another who overlooks this point when he argues that
incommensurability makes rational choice impossible. He assumes (apparently) that
qualitative comparison is essential to rational choice, but this is simply not true if we
distinguish between having reasons for choosing an option and having reasons that show
that option to be better than other alternatives. Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and
11
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seriously and carefully for a considerable amount of time. As your soulsearching progresses, you find yourself increasingly favoring being a
lawyer. Eventually, still without deciding whether to be a lawyer or a
novelist, you apply to law school to “keep the lawyer option open.” When
the time comes to decide whether to show up for the first day of class, you
go to “give the lawyer life a try.” If someone were to ask you why, you
would give the reasons provided by the lawyer values, and you would
explain that a long process of soul searching led you to finally favor those
reasons. Those reasons and the process are what show that your decision is
not like arbitrary like flipping a coin.
In such cases, a person may still decide to act on one of the sets of
reasons instead of the others. And the person will be able to explain why he
or she ended up favoring those reasons by describing the soul-searching
process. 13 The problem is that the kind of process we have just described
looks like it produces a relevant common scale. When, for example, you
finally decide in favor of the lawyer life, you do so because your soul
searching leads you to favor the lawyer reasons over the novelist reasons.
So there is a common scale after all: namely, “reasons favored over others
after serious reflection.” Proponents of incommensurability may well
respond that our “reasons favored” scale is not what they mean by a
“common scale.”14 They owe an explanation of what they do mean, and
they may be able to provide one, but we will put that issue aside. Instead,
we identify a particular type of reasoning that plays a central role in the
judicial decisions. We argue, in Section II, that decision-makers cannot
always compare relevant options using that type of reasoning. This narrow
incommensurability claim is sufficient for our purposes.
B. Value-Probability Reasoning
The common scale that concerns us is created through what we will
call Value-Probability reasoning (VP-reasoning).15 To illustrate VPreasoning, we return to the lawyer/novelist example. You are trying to
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 808 (1994).
13
“Able to explain” means able after adequate reflection. In our lawyer/novelist
example, we imagined you engaging in explicit soul searching and explicitly explaining
that process. In other cases, no such explicit process may occur. The person may, however,
be able—assuming adequate reflection—to provide a convincing narrative that explains
how he or she ended up favoring the reasons in question.
14
Raz, as we understand him, would interpret the choice as an act of will in the face of
options that are incommensurable (in our sense of incompleteness incommensurability).
See RAZ, ENGAGING REASON, supra note 10.
15
See Warner, Does Incommensurability Matter?, supra note 4, at 1309; Warner,
Impossible Comparisons, supra note 4, at 1712.
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choose between two actions: attending law school in order to become a
lawyer, and retiring to the woods to attempt to write your first novel. You
value being a novelist much more than being a lawyer. As we will say, you
rank being a novelist higher in the outcome ranking than being a lawyer. A
VP-reasoning outcome ranking is not just an ordering of outcomes above or
below each other. It also represents how far above or below each other they
are. It is a cardinal, not an ordinal ranking. The reason is that you get an
action ranking by combining probability estimates with the estimates of
how far one outcome outranks another.16 People can make rough “how far”
comparisons. Suppose, for example, that Smith decides to go into debt to
finance his daughter’s college education. When Smith’s friend says, “But
you will be in debt for five years,” Smith replies, “It would be worth ten
years of debt.”
Even though being a novelist outranks being a lawyer in the
outcome ranking, you still choose to go to law school. Why? Because you
do not just consider how much you value an outcome, but also the
probability that the associated action will achieve that outcome. You go to
law school because you think your chances of writing a novel are just about
nil, while you think it highly likely that you will do well in law school. So,
as we will say, going to law school ranks higher in your action ranking than
retiring to the woods. The example illustrates the general fact that people
often end up not pursuing what they value most highly.
In general, VP-reasoning consists of constructing an action ranking
out of an outcome ranking by finding an appropriate compromise between
how much you value an outcome and the probability of realizing that
outcome by the actions available to you. The process need not be
conscious, and need not be readily articulable when it is. Our talk of
probability calls for two comments. First, while it is natural to think of
probabilities in terms of numbers, there is no need to do so. Everyday
reasoning about probabilities can, and often does, proceed in terms of “a
small (significant, big) chance,” and the like. In general, estimates of
probability can be and typically are rough and ready approximate estimates
of the chance of something happening. The estimates need not be
conscious, and, if conscious, need not be precisely articulated. In general,
we do not have any mathematical model in mind.17 So understood, we take
16
Rational choice theory represents process of combining the estimates by
multiplication. The numerical representation of probability is multiplied by the numerical
representation of an outcome’s rank. See KEN BINMORE, RATIONAL DECISIONS (2011).
17
To those familiar with rational choice theory, our VP-reasoning may look like a
disguised description of that theory. That has things backwards. Rational choice theory is a
mathematical model of human decision making. What underlying reality does it model?
Our answer is VP-reasoning.
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it to be clear that people sometimes engage such reasoning, and that it is
indeed a common feature of daily life. Second, we make no claims about
how people combine their probability estimates and the outcome rankings—
with the exception of the following condition: an increase or decrease in
either the ranking of an outcome or the probability of its realizing an
associated action moves that action proportionately up or down in the
action ranking. We will call this the Interdependence Condition.
VP-reasoning involves two common scales. One is the scale on
which it ranks the relative value of the various outcomes with which the
person is concerned—in our example, becoming a lawyer and writing a
novel. It creates a second common scale out of the first by combining the
outcome ranking with the person’s views about probability to produce a
ranking of actions. We will call this the expected value ranking.18
C. A Narrower Conception of Commensurability
We can now formulate the narrower version of commensurability
with which we are concerned, VP-Reasoning Commensurability: All
reasons for and against an action are, in principle, comparable through VPreasoning. In the next section, we reformulate the two types of
incommensurability accordingly and illustrate each.
II. TWO TYPES OF INCOMMENSURABILITY
There are two types of incommensurability. The first—
incompleteness incommensurability—consists of the lack of any relevant
way to construct the outcome ranking VP-reasoning requires. The second
type—comparison-exclusion
incommensurability—consists
of
a
commitment that is inconsistent with deciding by VP-reasoning, even in
those cases in which such reasoning is possible.
A. Incompleteness Incommensurability
The source of incompleteness incommensurability is a gap in values.
Values are not complete maps. They may leave areas, even large areas,
partially filled in, or not filled in at all.19 The incompleteness can prevent
you from constructing the outcome rankings required for VP-reasoning. The
lawyer/novelist example is a case in point. The problem is that you cannot
construct the outcome ranking you need. What you need is a relevant
evaluative perspective distinct from the lawyer values and novelist values
18
19

We borrow the term from rational choice theory. BINMORE, supra note 16.
See RAZ, supra note 7, at 344.
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that will take both those perspectives into account and produce a cardinal
ranking of the outcomes of being a lawyer and being a novelist. You clearly
do not have this perspective when you initially confront the decision and
begin the soul-searching process. But what about the end result of that
process? We argued earlier that the process does yield a ranking of one
outcome over the other. There are two replies. The first is that such rankings
do not exist prior to your decision and so cannot be the basis on which you
decide. This reply is sufficient, so we will not pursue the second reply,
which is that the ranking is not a cardinal one.20
Current debates over privacy provide plausible examples of
incompleteness incommensurability. Privacy raises complex balancing
questions, and, as James Rule notes, “we cannot hope to answer [such
questions] until we have a way of ascribing weights to the things being
balanced. And that is exactly where parties to privacy debates are most
dramatically at odds.”21 The problem is plausibly like the lawyer/novelist
example. Different perspectives yield reasonably clear answers that yield
outcome rankings, but people cannot agree on an overall perspective that
gives due weight to the competing perspectives of privacy advocates,
defenders of government surveillance, and proponents of private data
collection.
How should courts and regulators respond to incompleteness
incommensurability? We think that constructing such rankings even when
they do not initially exist is one important function of courts in responding
to novel moral and political questions arising from social, economic, and
technological change. This claim is hardly uncontroversial. Some may insist
that, at least in some cases, it is impossible to construct relevant and
acceptable rankings where none exist initially, and, even when it is, some
may argue that construction rankings is not a task courts may legitimately
undertake. We put these issues aside. Our concern is primarily with
comparison-excluding commitments. In pursuing this concern, we are not
denying the existence of incompleteness incommensurability, nor are we
claiming that it cannot explain the phenomena we explain by appeal to
comparison-excluding incommensurability. We make two more modest
claims. First, there are clear cases of comparison-excluding
incommensurability. Second, that kind of incommensurability evidently
provides an illuminating explanation of some otherwise puzzling judicial
decisions. Devotees of incompleteness incommensurability may dispute the
second claim, but that is precisely the dispute we hope to initiate. Our goal
is a hearing for comparison-exclusion.
20

The idea is that the ranking is just a ranking of one option over another and does not
provide any basis for measuring how much one option outranks another.
21
JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL 183 (2007).
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B. Comparison-Excluding Commitments
We begin with two non-legal examples, and then discuss a legal
example at length.
1. Non-Legal Examples
Consider promising. Suppose you promise to accompany your friend
to the doctor on Tuesday; he is merely going for a routine check-up, but for
him visiting the doctor is an ordeal of fear and anxiety, and his plea for
emotional support moved you to promise. Shortly after you make the
promise, a colleague who has suddenly fallen sick asks you to teach her
class. If you had not promised to accompany your friend to the doctor, you
would agree, and your reason would be your colleague’s need, but you
refuse because your promise has already committed you to accompanying
your friend. The “already committed” is the essential point. The
commitment to future action created by promising is a commitment to stand
by a prior decision and not to reopen the question for resolution by VPreasoning that takes into account current facts. There are limits, of course.
Imagine that, when Tuesday arrives, you learn that your five year-old son is
lost in a city park. You do—and certainly should—decide to go look for
your son by VP-reasoning that compares your friend’s need for support
against your son’s welfare.
In general, by comparison-excluding commitments, we mean
commitments defined by the refusal, within limits,22 to decide certain
questions by engaging in VP-reasoning. There are many examples of such
commitments, for instance parental love. As Joseph Raz notes,
[f]or many, having children does not have a money price
because exchanging them for money, whether buying or selling, is
inconsistent with a proper appreciation of the value of parenthood. .
. . [B]oth their rejection of the idea that having children has a price
“The reason-excluding commitments one makes in one’s personal life need not
prohibit those household economies in which one trades goods such as health and safety off
against a variety of other goals. Similarly, societal commitments can exclude reasons in
some contexts and not others. The lines are often quite indeterminate, and this
indeterminateness does not matter. Rapid economic and technological change along with
globalization and the cultural conflicts it brings often pit reason-excluding commitments
against demands for greater economic efficiency and less constrained market competition.
We think the task is not just to decide whether to abandon or maintain a commitment, but,
as a necessary prelude to any such decision, to define the boundaries of the commitment
with far more precision than in the past.” Warner, Does Incommensurability Matter?, supra
note 4.
22
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and their refusal even to contemplate such exchanges are part of
their respect for parenthood, and of the very high value they place
on having children."23
Put aside cases in which dire need might make selling a child something
one would consider—e. g., your daughter will die if she does not receive
treatment you cannot afford but which the stranger who offers to buy her
will immediately provide. We take it to be clear that there are a range of
cases in which parents have a commitment to their children which is
defined in part by the refusal to engage in VP-reasoning to decide whether
to exchange them for a certain sum of money.
2. The “Very Great Value” Objection
Many will object that there is a simple explanation of such
commitments that does not appeal to comparison-exclusion.24 Why not
simply say, in the promising case, for example, that your commitment is,
within broad limits, to rank keeping your promise above all other competing
outcomes? Then as long as you are sufficiently certain you will succeed
when you try to keep your promise, keeping it will come out on top in the
action ranking. Looking at it this way, you do compare reasons; it is just
that your promise always wins.
In reply, consider more complex outcomes, and, as an aid to the
imagination, change the commitment from promising to parental love.
Suppose a stranger offers you the following lottery.25 If you enter the
lottery, you have a 50% chance of getting $1 million and keeping your
daughter, and a 50% chance of getting $1 million in exchange for giving
you daughter to the stranger to raise. Suppose that neither you nor your
daughter have any dire need for the money. For example, you daughter will
not die for lack of medical treatment unless you have $1 million. You
indignantly refuse, saying, “Daughters are not poker chips. You don’t
gamble with them for money!” Your attitude is the one Raz characterizes,
“[f]or many, having children does not have a money price because
exchanging them for money, whether buying or selling, is inconsistent with
a proper appreciation of the value of parenthood.”26 To be clear, we are not
saying one must have such a commitment to one’s children—just that one
could, and indeed many do. Now, imagine the stranger responds with
improved odds. He offers a 70%/30% deal: a 70% chance of getting $1
million and keeping your daughter, and a 30% chance of getting $1 million
23

RAZ, supra note 7, at 348.
This argument is adapted from Warner, Impossible Comparisons, supra note 4.
25
See Warner, Impossible Comparisons, supra note 4, at 1720-23.
26
RAZ, supra note 7, at 348.
24
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in exchange for her. You again refuse, and the stranger again improves the
odds, and you again refuse. No matter how good the odds, you will always
refuse—as long as you continue with your commitment to your daughter.
The problem for VP-reasoning is that it predicts the opposite—no
matter how much keeping your daughter outranks all other outcomes.27 This
is easiest to see if we use dollar amounts to represent the place an outcome
has in the outcome ranking. The relevant outcomes are keeping your
daughter, not keeping her, and getting $1 million. We assume, for the
moment, that we can assign numbers to represent how much you value the
options relative to each other. This is the beginning of a small bit of
mathematical precision that is a useful and harmless idealization. It is useful
because allows us to derive results easily and clearly. It is harmless because
the results remain valid for the un-idealized reality. The numbers we use
don’t matter at all; just the relative difference in value matters. In this case
we will use dollars. So assign $10 million to keeping your daughter, and $0
to not keeping her. Now consider the lottery in which you have a 99%
chance of keeping your daughter and getting the million, and 1% of having
to give her up and getting the million. Will you enter the lottery?
VP-reasoning predicts you will. That result is guaranteed by the
Interdependence Condition: an increase or decrease in either the ranking of
an outcome or the probability of its realizing the associated action moves
that action proportionately up or down in the action ranking. This is easiest
way to see this is to continue our bit of mathematization and use
multiplication to represent the way the outcome ranking combines with
probabilities to produce the action ranking. Then you get the expected value
of entering the lottery by adding the expected value of its two possible
outcomes: keeping your daughter and getting $10 million or $1 million, and
losing your daughter and getting $1 million. The expected value of the first
outcome is: The rank of the action of entering the lottery in the action
ranking is given by 0.99 x ($10 million [= keep daughter] + $1 million) =
$10,890,000. The expected value of losing your daughter is 0.1 x ($0 [=
lose daughter]+ $1 million) = $100,000. So the expected value of entering
the lottery is $10,990,000. You only value your daughter at $10,000,000, so
you will enter the lottery.
The problem disappears if you assign an infinite value to your
daughter. Then no value that can be measured finitely (using money or
finite numbers generally) will induce you to sell her. But this will not do
here. To see the problem, ask, “What does it mean to say you value your
daughter 'infinitely’?” There may appear to be an easy explanation: namely,

27
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that you will not exchange her for any finite gain in value.28 But that fact is
what the appeal to infinite value is supposed to explain. So that explanation
is not available, and there does not appear to be any other.
3. A Legal Example
Moore v. The Regents of the University of California29 is a good
legal example. As part of Moore's treatment for leukemia, a UCLA medical
center doctor removed Moore’s spleen.30
The spleen contained
commercially valuable anomalous genetic material, and the doctor and
medical center claimed ownership and sold the material.31 Moore claimed
the genetic material was his property and sued for conversion.32 The
majority compared the reasons to recognize the doctor’s and hospital’s
ownership claim to the reasons to recognize a property right for Moore.33
They decided against Moore on the ground that recognizing the right would
have the profound negative effect on research and consequently on overall
health and would result in an overall increase in health care expenditures.34
While the majority does not of course express itself in terms of outcome
rankings and action rankings, we can nonetheless describe its decision in
that way: it ranks the outcome of no negative effects on research and health
over the outcome in which Moore possesses the property right in question.
Since the majority evidently takes the probability of the negative effects to
be quite high, denying Moore the right ends up at the top of the action
ranking.
Justice Mosk dissents, claiming that:
[O]ur society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to
respect the human body as the physical and temporal expression of
the unique human persona. One manifestation. . . is the prohibition
against indirect abuse of the body by its economic exploitation for
the sole benefit of another person . . . “The dignity and sanctity with
which we regard the human whole . . . are absent when we allow
researchers to further their own interests without the patient's
participation by using a patient's cells as the basis for a marketable

28

See Warner, Impossible Comparisons, supra note 4, at 1720-23.
Moore v. the Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal 3rd 120 (1990).
30
Id. at 126.
31
The private company that bought the material gave $1,000,000 over a three year
period to the doctor and UCLA, and the doctor received 75,000 shares of stock and became
a paid consultant for the company. Id. at 183.
32
Id. at 156–57, 169–70, 173–74.
33
See id.
34
See id. at 145-46.
29
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product.”35
On its face, this is puzzling. Is Mosk claiming that the majority
ranked outcomes incorrectly, and that the dignity-respecting outcome in
which Moore has the right should outrank the outcome in which research
and health are not impeded by such property rights?36 The problem is that
Mosk makes no attempt whatsoever to show that this is true,37 and one can
hardly expect to cut much judicial ice with the completely unsupported
claim that the majority ranked wrongly. One way to avoid this difficulty is
to see Mosk as making the incompleteness incommensurability claim that
there is no way to rank the dignity and health outcomes. However, this is
hardly plausible. It is routine to rank dignity against health considerations
in deciding, for example, on health care budgets.
A comparison-excluding incommensurability claim is a plausible
alternative. We suggest Mosk is asserting that society has a commitment to
respecting the dignity and sanctity of the human whole which is defined in
part by the refusal to engage in VP-reasoning that ranks the impact on
health care against violate Moore’s dignity. The commitment makes the
decision easy. As long as Mosk remains faithful to it, he decides in favor of
granting Moore the right. Our claim is not that Mosk is right to recognize
such a commitment. Our point is that his position, right or wrong,
illustrates a comparison-excluding commitment.
Why give comparison-excluding commitments such a central role?
Our answer is that we do so because such commitments figure prominently
in our defining who we are, as one of us has argued elsewhere. We are
defined both by what we are willing to do and by what we are not willing to
do—by the possibilities we regard as closed off. The “closing off” plays a
central role in our definition of our identities, which are shaped as much by
what we cannot do as by what we can. For example, suppose someone
35
Id. Moore v. the Regents of the University of California, supra note 29 at 182–84
(Mosk, J. dissenting) (quoting Mary T. X, Cells, Sales, & Royalties: The Patient’s Right to
a Portion of the Profit, 6 YALE L. & POLY REV., 179, 190 (1990)) (emphasis added).
36
Mosk describes his approach as a straightforward balancing of reasons: “in my view
whatever merit the majority’s single policy consideration may have is outweighed by two
contrary considerations.” Id. at 182 (emphasis added). For reasons that follow, we think
Mosk misinterprets his own position.
37
Id. at 164–65 (Arabian, J., concurring). Justice Arabian wants to know how to
balance the dignity reasons against the scientific research reasons. He asks, “Does it uplift
or degrade the unique human persona to treat human tissue as a fungible article of
commerce? Would it advance or impede the human condition, spiritually or scientifically,
by delivering the majestic force of the law behind the plaintiff's claim?” He despairs of
answering these questions. “I do not know the answers to these troubling questions, nor am
I willing—like Justice Mosk—to treat them . . . as issues . . . susceptible of judicial
resolution.” Justice Arabian in his dissent emphasizes this problem. He contends that
Mosk’s “eloquent paean to the human spirit illuminates the problem, but not the solution.”
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suggests to you that you should lie on your resume. They point out that no
one would ever discover the lie. You respond with outrage, "I cannot do
that. What sort of person do you think I am?" Not every identity-defining
commitment is a comparison-excluding commitment, but the comparisonexcluding ones play an important identity-defining role.38 This is not to say
that every such commitment does. You can be committed to maintaining
your health in a way that blocks VP-reasoning involving financial
considerations as reasons to forego needed treatment, but the commitment
need not play a major role in defining your identity.
III. TRADE DISPUTE EXAMPLES
In trade disputes, courts traditionally engage in “synthesizing and
maximizing complex preferences”39 in ways that assume commensurability.
We offer three examples. We first illustrate the assumption of
commensurability and then argue that in all three cases either the parties or
the court is best seen as implicitly advancing a comparison-exclusion claim.
A. The Assumption of Commensurability
This assumption is built into the various tests the courts use in trade
disputes, such as the necessity (least trade restrictive) test and the balancing
test.40 The differences are more differences in name than in substance, and
the tests assume commensurability in essentially the same way.
Take the necessity test first. The court often faces a case in which a
government measure allegedly interferes with free international commerce.
To evaluate a trade-restrictive measure, the court decides whether the
restrictions are truly “necessary” to achieve putative regulatory goals. To do
so, the court articulates a hypothetical less restrictive alternative, and, if it
finds the reasons for adopting the hypothetical policy to be at least as good
as the reasons offered for adopting the more restrictive alternative, court
concludes that the government should have adopted the hypothetical policy.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court assumes (often implicitly) that the
two alternatives are equally effective, or that, if the hypothetical alternative
is less effective, its lower burden on trade more than compensates for that.
38

Warner, Excluding Reasons, supra note 4, at 443.
Trachtman, supra note 3 at 34.
40
Id. at 35 – 36; Alan O. Sykes, The Least Trade Restrictive Means, 70 UNIV. CHIC.
LAW REV. 403, 415 (2003) (observing that the least trade restrictive test in the WTO is a
“crude cost-benefit analysis” accompanied by no sophisticated quantitative analysis). See
also Donald H. Regan, The Meaning of ‘Necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article
XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 347, 367 (2007).
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To proceed in this way is to assume that the reasons for the measure at issue
and the reasons favoring the hypothetical alternative are comparable
through VP-reasoning. The items in the outcome ranking are states of
affairs in which the regulatory goal is achieved with greater or lesser impact
on trade. Those with lesser impact rank higher. The action ranking results
from considering the probability that a particular measure will realize the
associated outcome. A measure is “necessary” if it is at the top of the action
ranking.
A case in point is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)41 dispute between the United States and Thailand over cigarette
imports.42 In late Eighties, Thailand banned the importation of foreign
cigarettes on the ground that certain flavors or additives made them both
more addictive and more appealing to female and young smokers than harsh
tasting domestic cigarettes made of indigenous tobacco leaves. A GATT
panel struck down the Thai ban as unnecessary. The panel compared the
less trade-restrictive policy of labeling and disclosure regulations to
Thailand’s complete ban, and found that there was a better reason for
Thailand to adopt the former policy. The panel noted that
[O]ther countries had introduced strict, non-discriminatory
labeling and ingredient disclosure regulations which allowed
governments to control, and the public to be informed of, the content
of cigarettes. A non-discriminatory regulation implemented on a
national treatment basis in accordance with Article III:4 requiring
complete disclosure of ingredients, coupled with a ban on unhealthy
substances, would be an alternative consistent with the General
Agreement. The Panel considered that Thailand could reasonably be
expected to take such measures to address the quality-related policy
objectives it now pursues through an import ban on all cigarettes
whatever their ingredients.43
What is the relevance of other countries adopting labeling and
disclosure regulations instead of a complete ban? It is evidence that, in VPreasoning terms, achieving public health regulatory goals through such
measures ranks at the top of the action ranking. This is why “Thailand could
reasonably be expected to take such measures.”
More recently, the WTO’s High Court, the Appellate Body (AB),
embraced the “weighing and balancing” test. This new test is an extension
of the traditional least-trade restrictive test in that it spells out detailed
41

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A5, 55
U.N.T.S. 188.
42
Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted
on Nov. 7, 1990, B.I.S.D. 37S/200 [hereinafter Thai Cigarettes].
43
Id., para. 77.
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criteria to be used in comparing (“weighing and balancing”) reasons. Such
explicit criteria were largely missing in the least-trade restrictive test.
Korea — Various Measures on Beef (Korean Beef) illustrates the test, and
its assumption of commensurability. Korea maintained a dual retail system,
which required domestic beef retailers to maintain strictly separate physical
points of sale for domestic beef (Hanwoo) and imported beef. 44 The goal
was to prevent consumer confusion and fraud. In adjudicating this case, the
AB devised a general test to determine the justifiability (necessity) of
domestic regulations:
In sum, determination of whether a measure … may nevertheless
be "necessary" within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves
in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors
which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance
measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the
importance of the common interests or values protected by that law
or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation
on imports or exports.45
The relevant alternative to the dual retail system was the use of
“inspections, investigations and prosecutions,” methods Korea did indeed
use to regulate imports of pork and seafood.46 The weighing and balancing
tests criteria are criteria for constructing the outcome ranking consisting of
combinations of regulatory goals and burdens on trade. The AB found that:
Korea failed to demonstrate that the WTO-consistent alternatives
shown by the complaining parties to be available were inadequate to
secure compliance with the Unfair Competition Act with regard to
imported beef. The Panel found that Korea employed traditional
and WTO-consistent means, such as inspections, investigations and
prosecutions, to enforce the Unfair Competition Act with respect to
other imported food products. The Panel regarded this as evidence
that Korea could eliminate any fraud involving beef with the same

Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korean Beef].
45
Id. at ¶ 164; but see Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS/26/AB/R; WT/DS/48/AB/R,
(Jan. 18, 1998) (denying the commensurability between naturally occurring hormones in
foods and artificially administered hormones for the growth promotion purpose considering
the EU’s zero-tolerance policy on hormone risks in foods); in addition, see Panel Report,
United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23/R; 39S/206 (19
June 1992) (denying the commensurability between the U.S.’ low alcohol content beer and
Canada’s high alcohol content beer based on the former’s historically unique legislative
background involving the Temperance Movement).
46
Id.
44

18

Cho and Warner

[3-Feb-16

measures.47
The “evidence that Korea could eliminate any fraud involving beef
with the same measures” is evidence that “inspections, investigations and
prosecutions” would be sufficiently likely to achieve Korea’s regulatory
goals to put those methods at the top of the relevant action ranking.
Our third and final example is another “inspection alternative
preferred” case, the United States domestic trade case, Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison.48 An Illinois milk distributor challenged a City of
Madison, Wisconsin ordinance that prohibited the sale of any milk as
pasteurized “unless it has been processed and bottled at an approved
pasteurization plant within a radius of five miles from the central square of
Madison” and “unless from a source of supply possessing a permit issued
after inspection by Madison officials.” 49 In such cases, a court may
condemn a state regulation as a violation of the free trade constitution when
it finds that the state should have adopted a less trade-restrictive alternative.
Justice Clark, writing on behalf of the majority, condemns Madison’s
ordinance on precisely those grounds.50 The Court acknowledges that there
may be a public health reason for the city to favor local milk production, but
it thinks there is a less trade restrictive alternative that would be sufficiently
effective in achieving Madison’s regulatory goals.51 As Justice Clark
contends:
It appears that reasonable and adequate alternatives are
available. If the City of Madison prefers to rely upon its own
officials for inspection of distant milk sources, such inspection is
readily open to it without hardship for it could charge the actual and
reasonable cost of such inspection to the importing producers and
processors.52
B. Implicit Comparison-Exclusion Claims
Trade dispute cases exhibit the same pattern we noted in Mosk’s
dissent. The pattern has two parts. The first is a claim that appears to require
empirical support but has none (Mosk’s claim that dignity considerations
should predominate over the impact on research). The second is the
plausible recognition of a comparison-excluding commitment that obviates
47

Id. at ¶ 55.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
49
Id. at 350.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 354.
52
Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
48
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the need for empirical support.
We begin with Thai Cigarettes. The Thai government contended
that:
[C]onsumption of cigarettes had continued to rise in Thailand, in
spite of the efforts by the government with the support of nongovernmental organizations, because such campaigns took a long
time to produce effects, as had been seen in the United States where
consumption had continued to rise until 1981, even though the first
anti-smoking campaign had been initiated in 1965. (…) Health
considerations overrode any other policy objectives of the
government. Thus, the Ministry of Finance had estimated that the
importation of cigarettes would yield an extra revenue of baht 800
million (about US$30 million) per year which was a substantial sum
for a developing country. However, the government had decided to
forego this sum in deference to public health considerations.53
What did the Thai government do when it decide to forego the
economic gain “in deference to health considerations”? Did it engage in
VP-reasoning? Doing so would mean comparing two measures: protecting
health through an outright ban on foreign cigarette imports, and protecting
health through labeling and disclosures requirements. The problem is that
the comparison most likely comes out against the ban, as the Thai
government almost certainly realized. It was well aware that issuing import
licenses to foreign tobacco companies would have generated enormous
revenues and perhaps increased economic growth. A more plausible view is
that the Thai Government had a comparison-excluding commitment to
public health that was inconsistent with trading public health against
(certain types of) economic gain in VP-reasoning.
Korean Beef is similar. The Korean government argued that:
[T]he "specialized store" system for imported beef was
established in order to protect consumers from widespread deceptive
practices of selling imported beef as domestic products. The
majority of beef stores in Korea are operated in the form of smallscale butcher shops where all meat is stored in one huge freezer and
sold in slices. It is extremely difficult for consumers to distinguish
domestic beef from imported beef at sight, nor is there any practical
technique developed for easy distinction between the two. Under
such circumstances, the considerable price difference between the
imported and the domestic beef would easily raise the incentives for
the owners of the butcher shops to engage in fraudulent practices,
which the Korean Government found were extremely difficult to
53
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detect and sanction. Thus, the system of separate sales outlets was
introduced as the only practical solution to effectively deal with the
problem of widespread fraudulent sales practices.54
How can the “system of separate sales outlets [be] the only practical
solution to effectively deal with the problem of widespread fraudulent sales
practices”? AB’s objection would seem decisive that “inspections,
investigations and prosecutions” would be effective enough to accomplish
Korea’s regulatory goals—especially given that Korea found those
procedures acceptable to regulate pork and seafood imports. Hanwoo claims
a special cultural place in the diet of Koreans,55 a special enough place that
it is plausible that Korea based its ban on a comparison-excluding
commitment that was inconsistent with VP-reasoning that would potentially
favor reducing burdens on international trade over preserving position of
Hanwoo beef in Korean culture.
Dean Milk is similar. The Court struck down Madison’s ban on outof-state milk in favor of a less trade-restrictive alternative of inspections. 56
In dissent, Justice Black contended that:
Characterization of [the ban] as a "discriminatory burden" on
interstate commerce is merely a statement of the Court's result,
which I think incorrect. The section does prohibit the sale of milk in
Madison by interstate and intrastate producers who prefer to
pasteurize over five miles distant from the city. But both state courts
below found that [the ban] represents a good-faith attempt to
safeguard public health by making adequate sanitation inspections
possible. (...)
This health regulation should not be invalidated merely because
the Court believes that alternative milk-inspection methods might
insure the cleanliness and healthfulness of Dean's Illinois milk. (...)
From what this record shows, and from what it fails to show, I
do not think that either of the alternatives suggested by the Court
would assure the people of Madison as pure a supply of milk as they
receive under their own ordinance. On this record I would uphold
the Madison law.57
How can this be an answer to the majority? Black objects that
inspections would not “assure the people of Madison as pure a supply of
milk as they receive under their own ordinance.” The majority’s position is
that inspections would be sufficiently effective, not that they would be
equally effective, and that any loss in effectiveness would be offset by the
54
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lesser burden on trade. These problems disappear if we interpret Black’s
claim that Madison’s concern to “safeguard public health” involves a
commitment that blocks deciding through VP-reasoning as the majority
does.
Three decades later, the Court reaffirmed Justice Black’s dissent in
Maine v. Taylor, which concerned the constitutionality of a Maine statute
prohibiting the importation of live baitfish (golden shiners).58 The rationale
was that “Maine's population of wild fish—including its own indigenous
golden shiners—would be placed at risk by three types of parasites
prevalent in out-of-state baitfish, but not common to wild fish in Maine.
Second, nonnative species inadvertently included in shipments of live
baitfish could disturb Maine's aquatic ecology to an unpredictable extent by
competing with native fish for food or habitat, by preying on native species,
or by disrupting the environment in more subtle ways.”59 Taylor, who ran a
bait business in Maine, was found to violate the statute when he imported
158,000 live golden shiners from outside of Maine.60 The Court of Appeals
endorsed Taylor’s claim that a less trade-restrictive alternative, such as
sampling and inspection procedures, rather than the outright ban at issue
“could be easily developed” considering the existing techniques.61
However, the Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Blackmun wrote on behalf
of a majority that:
[W]e agree with the District Court that the "abstract possibility"
of developing acceptable testing procedures, particularly when there
is no assurance as to their effectiveness, does not make those
procedures an "[a]vailabl[e] . . . nondiscriminatory alternativ[e]" for
purpose of the Commerce Clause. A State must make reasonable
efforts to avoid restraining the free flow of commerce across its
borders, but it is not required to develop new and unproven means of
protection at an uncertain cost.(...)
We agree with the District Court that Maine has a legitimate
interest in guarding against imperfectly understood environmental
risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately prove to be
negligible. "[T]he constitutional principles underlying the
Commerce Clause cannot be read as requiring the State of Maine to
sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental
damage has occurred or until the scientific community agrees on
what disease organisms are or are not dangerous before it acts to
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Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
Id. at 477.
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Id. at 132.
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avoid such consequences."62
How can it be true that the “‘abstract possibility’ of developing
acceptable testing procedures . . . does not make those procedures an
‘[a]vailabl[e] . . . nondiscriminatory alternativ[e]’ for purpose of the
Commerce Clause?” Taylor’s claim is that developing testing procedures is
better justified than the current ban. Justice Blackmun’s position is that the
procedures are not an "[a]vailabl[e] . . . nondiscriminatory alternativ[e]."
That means the Court may simply ignore the testing procedures in
adjudicating the case. The reason is that the procedures are an "abstract
possibility" with “no assurance as to their effectiveness.”
On its face, this is quite puzzling. There appear to be just two
possibilities, both unsatisfactory. One is that the Court is making the
empirical claim on the effectiveness of the testing procedures. The appeals
court disagreed with the district court on precisely this point.63 The Court
provides no more empirical evidence to resolve the dispute, so this
interpretation would mean that it just arbitrarily sided with the district court.
The other possibility is that the Court is saying that the mere fact that the
testing procedures are an “abstract possibility” means that the Court may
ignore them. But how can it be an answer to Taylor’s argument? This is
tantamount to the Court saying, “We will not reply.” There is, however, a
third possibility: an appeal to a comparison-excluding commitment to
protecting the environment. That would explain Blackmun’s attitude as long
as the commitment blocks weighing environmental concerns against
economic gains from trade.
European Court of Justice (ECJ) cases offer similar examples. The
Omega decision is particularly instructive. In Bonn, Germany, Omega
operated a “laserdrome” offering games in which players fired “submachine-gun-type laser targeting devices at sensory tags installed either in
corridors where the firing took place or on jackets worn by other players.”64
The community protested, and the Bonn police prohibited the
Omega’s operation. The rationale for the prohibition was that the games
“constituted a danger to public order, since the acts of simulated homicide
and the trivialization of violence thereby engendered were contrary to
fundamental values prevailing in public opinion.”65 Omega challenged the
prohibition as a violation of its freedom to provide services under the law of
62

Id. at 14748.
752 F.2d 757, 762.
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Court of Justice of the European Communities, Press Release, No 82/04, October
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Court of Justice of the European Communities, Judgment of 14 October 2004, C36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der
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the European Union (Article 49 EC).66 The German Federal Administrative
Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) referred the case to the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling.
The ECJ upheld the prohibition. They note that both national
constitutions of Member States of the European Union (EU) and the EU law
solemnly protect fundamental rights, such as human dignity:
Since both the Community and its Member States are required to
respect fundamental rights, the protection of those rights is a
legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the
obligations imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental
freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as the freedom to provide
services.67
The ECJ notes that the German community’s view is that those
“playing at killing” in Omega’s games “infringed a fundamental value
enshrined in the national constitution, namely human dignity.” 68
The question is whether the court should decide in favor of the
freedom to provide services or in favor of Germany’s concerns about
human dignity. The ECJ describes itself as deciding this question by
applying the proportionality test.69 Typically, the three parts of the test can
be summarized as follows: first, whether the measure was an effective
means to achieve a legitimate goal; second, whether the measure was the
least restrictive means of achieving the goal; third, whether the measure
affected the applicant's interests in an excessive manner.70 Here is the ECJ’s
application of the test:
[T]he prohibition on the commercial exploitation of games
involving the simulation of acts of violence against persons, in
particular the representation of acts of homicide, corresponds to the
level of protection of human dignity which the national constitution
seeks to guarantee in the territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany. It should also be noted that, by prohibiting only the
variant of the laser game the object of which is to fire on human
targets and thus ‘play at killing’ people, the contested order did not
go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective pursued
by the competent national authorities.71
It is difficult to see how “prohibiting only the variant of the laser
66

Id., para. 9.
Id., para. 35.
68
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game the object of which is to fire on human targets” does not “go beyond
what is necessary in order to attain the objective.” On its face, the
prohibition excludes a variant of the childhood game of tag in which players
use laser pointing devices which do not look like guns, and in which the
goal is simply to tag as many other players as possible (a tagged player is
eliminated from the game). The ECJ evidently equates even that game with
playing at killing people when it describes the Omega game as a “laser
game the object of which is to fire on human targets and thus ‘play at
killing’ people.” But surely the assertion of that equivalence requires
support, support the ECJ does not provide. The ECJ may have left such a
gaping hole in its decision, but it is implausible that skilled and experience
judges did so.
An appeal to comparison-excluding commitments offers an alternate
explanation that avoids attributing this error to the court. Suppose the court
saw the German community as embracing a commitment to human dignity
similar to the one we attributed earlier to Justice Mosk. Suppose further that
that court understood that commitment to be inconsistent with Germany
permitting Omega to offer any game in which players aim laser devices at
human beings in order to eliminate them from the game. The commitment
classifies any such game as playing at killing .There is, indeed, only one
way for Germany to act consistently with that commitment: ban all such
games. There is no less restrictive alternative.
This is a possible interpretation, but is it what the court had in mind?
Or should have had in mind? The answer to the first question calls for a
more thorough examination of the ECJ’s decisions, and a thorough
sociological study that would provide background about the relevant views
of both the German public and the court. The second question calls for a
normative proposal about the role of comparison-excluding commitments in
ECJ decisions. Pursuing these questions is well beyond the scope of this
paper. Our goal has been simply to raise them.
IV. ADJUDICATING COMPARISON-EXCLUSION CLAIMS
Our examples leave a critical question unanswered. When a party
(or the court on behalf of a party) bases a claim on a comparison-excluding
commitment, how do courts weigh the pros and cons of deciding for or
against a comparison-excluding commitment? Any decision procedure must
meet the following requirement of political legitimacy. A legitimate
governmental decision-maker “accepts the responsibility, among other
things, to explain, particularly to those adversely affected, why different
treatment of others in other circumstances is not capricious or arbitrary or
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discriminatory.”72 It would violate this requirement if a court, without
adequate explanation of why it was doing so, used VP-reasoning to reject
the comparison-excluding commitment by comparing the policy it supports
to an alternative policy when the commitment is inconsistent with such
comparison. So how do courts evaluate comparison-excluding
commitments in ways that allow them to provide the kind of explanation
legitimacy requires?
This question lies well beyond the scope of this article, but we note
one suggestive recent development in domestic and international trade
cases: roughly, courts will uphold significantly trade-restrictive regulations
without any serious balancing of alternatives if they are convinced the
regulation was adopted after a procedurally adequate consideration of all
relevant factors.73 As Donald Kommers and Michel Waelbroeck aptly
observe:
In the newer cases what is regulated is less important than how it is
regulated. The practical operation of a regulatory scheme is more
important than whether it affects intrastate or interstate commerce
directly or incidentally.74
WTO cases exhibit similar pattern. Consider Gasoline, the very first
decision under the (WTO) dispute settlement system.75 In 1995, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the “Gasoline Rule” in an
effort to prevent the air quality from deteriorating below the 1990 level.76
The rule imposed baseline standards for emission on gasoline refiners, but it
imposed more burdensome standards on foreign refiners and importers than
72
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on domestic ones.77
A WTO panel rejected the rule as a discriminatory measure not
“primarily aimed at” protecting the environment.78 The WTO Appellate
Body (AB) disagreed with the panel’s ruling.79 It found the existence of a
“substantial relationship” between the rule and the environmental goal that
it pursued. However, the AB still rejected the rule on the grounds that it
violated a GATT requirement that regulatory measures shall “not [be]
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination.”80 The AB interpreted this to require “good
faith.”81 To the AB, keeping good faith in this interdependent global
trading community means that regulating countries (here the U.S.) should
“take into account” the interests of trading partners, such as exporters (here
Brazil and Venezuela), and make serious efforts to consult with the latter
for a possible cooperative arrangement.82 In this case, the U.S. failed to
do.83
How many of the “good faith/procedurally adequate consideration”
cases actually involve comparison-excluding commitments? And, when
they do, what reason is there to think that the decisions comply with the
requirements of political legitimacy? These questions, as interesting and
77
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important as they are, lie beyond the scope of what we can consider here.
We conclude by noting that it is essential to find some way for courts to
address comparison-excluding commitments. Laws governing crucial
concerns in people’s lives should be informed by a proper appreciation of
what those concerns are, and those concerns include comparison-excluding
commitments. They do because such commitments lie at the heart of
people’s—and societies’—identities. We touched on this point when
discussing Justice Mosk’s dissent in Moore. We conclude with a brief
return to the same theme.
CONCLUSION: ADJUDICATING IDENTITY
We begin with individuals. William James captures the relevant
concept of the self. “I am,” James writes,
[O]ften confronted by the necessity of standing by one of
my . . . selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would
not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well dressed,
and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a bon
vivant, and a lady killer, as well as a philosopher, and a
philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as
well as a ‘tone poet’ and saint. But the thing is simply
impossible . . . Such characters may at the outset of life be
alike possible to a man. But to make anyone of them actual,
the rest must be more or less suppressed. So the seeker of
his truest, strongest, deepest self must review the list
carefully, and pick out the one on which to stake his
salvation.84
The essential point is that you make yourself who you are by what
you “stand by,” by the commitments you strive to realize. James suggests
(in this passage at least) that one central commitment defines who you are,
but that is incorrect. Selves consist of commitments to multiple, different,
and sometimes incompatible roles. The self you seek to realize is a
multifaceted self.
The commitments that lie at the center of one’s self-definition are
often comparison-excluding commitments—commitments to children,
friends, ideals, for example. The same is true of society. Societies often
exhibit widely shared comparison-excluding commitments. Thai Cigarettes
illustrates this point. Thailand answered “no” to the question of whether it
was the sort of nation that sacrifices public health to permit the importation
of cigarettes and thereby realize many advantages. The “no” answer was an
84
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expression of social identity. Similarly, Justice Mosk in Moore asks
whether the State of California is the sort of community that will sacrifice
human dignity for advances in health care research. As the trade dispute
cases show, courts sometimes have to adjudicate such questions of societal
identity when they confront comparison-excluding commitments. It is
essential to find an appropriate way to do so.

